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MARGARET COLGATE LOVE† 
People who commit a crime and are brought before a court to be 
sentenced expect to face a prison term or at least probation, and per-
haps a fine.  They may expect to experience a degree of social oppro-
brium, the so-called “stigma of conviction.”  They surely understand 
that having a criminal record is not career-enhancing.  But they also 
probably think that at some point they will be able to pay their debt to 
society and return to its good graces.  They are reinforced in their be-
lief in the possibility of redemption by periodic reminders from our 
elected leaders:  President George W. Bush called America “the land 
of second chance,”1 and President Obama famously called to congrat-
ulate the Philadelphia Eagles for letting Michael Vick walk directly 
from prison back into the team’s starting lineup.2 
But the reality for people of ordinary abilities is very different.  For 
them, the so-called “collateral” consequences of conviction are nu-
merous, severe, and very hard to mitigate.  Moreover, because convic-
 
 †
 Law Office of Margaret Love.  Chair, Drafting Committee of the ABA Criminal 
Justice Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Con-
victed Persons, 2001–2004.  Email:  margaretlove@pardonlaw.com. 
1
George W. Bush, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 
2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004_ 
presidential_documents&docid=pd26ja04_txt-10.pdf.  
2
Michael D. Shear, Obama Is Glad That Vick Has Second Chance, NYTIMES.COM, THE 
CAUCUS BLOG (Dec. 28, 2010, 12:59 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/12/28/obama-glad-michael-vick-has-second-chance/.  
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tion-based disqualifications are generally imposed by statute or regula-
tion rather than by a judge in open court, criminal defendants usually 
have no idea what is in store for them.  While conventionally labeled 
as “civil,” collateral consequences are increasingly understood and ex-
perienced as criminal punishment, and never-ending punishment at 
that.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court suggested that these 
disproportionate, rigid, and largely secret penalties have constitution-
al limits.3  At one level, Padilla is about a lawyer’s duty to warn a client 
considering a guilty plea about the likelihood of deportation.  At an-
other, Padilla sends a shot across the bow of a justice system whose ef-
fects are increasingly felt in contexts over which courts have no con-
trol.  Padilla gives new force to an argument that criminal offenders 
are entitled to a chance at forgiveness. 
I.  CIVIL DEATH, THEN AND NOW 
From colonial times, American law has recognized that a criminal 
conviction carries with it a permanent debasement of legal status.  
The idea that criminals should be marked and segregated from the 
rest of society “derived from the ancient Greek concept of ‘infamy,’ or 
the penalty of ‘outlawry’ among the Germanic tribes.”4  Conviction led 
to “‘civil death’ in the Middle Ages and to exile by ‘transportation’ 
during the Enlightenment.”5  Chief Justice Earl Warren once observed 
that “[c]onviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which 
not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil 
disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his reputation and 
economic opportunities.”6  It is this semi-outlaw status more than any 
prison term or fine that is frequently a criminal defendant’s most se-
rious punishment, stripping him of any defense against the most un-
reasonable and mean-spirited discrimination. 
 
3
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (holding that “constitutionally competent counsel 
would have advised [the defendant] that his conviction for drug distribution made him 
subject to automatic deportation”). 
4
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  COLLATERAL SANCTIONS 
AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS cmt. at 7 n.1 (3d ed. 
2004) (quoting Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their 
Removal:  A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 350-51 
(1968)).  The commentary to the ABA Standards notes, “Given the number of people 
who have been convicted at one time or another, collateral consequences have become 
one of the most significant methods of assigning legal status in America.”  Id. at 9.  
5
Id. at 7 n.1.  
6
Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).   
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Fifty years ago, the phenomenon that Dean Nora Demleitner has 
described as “internal exile”7 had a limited impact on American socie-
ty:  conviction was comparatively rare, criminal records were hard to 
access, and official forgiveness was relatively easy to obtain.  The re-
formers of that bygone era thought permanent branding inhumane 
and inefficient, presidents and governors still considered pardoning a 
part of their job, and the Model Penal Code reflected the new fascina-
tion with judicial restoration of rights through vacatur and expunge-
ment.8  The systemic balance of rule and discretion of which Professor 
Wechsler spoke was definitely tilted toward the latter,9 and punish-
ment theory was rooted in the possibility of redemption.  In 1967, the 
President’s Crime Commission called for the wholesale reform of 
“the . . . system of disabilities and disqualifications that has grown up” 
because it interfered with rehabilitative efforts that were the goal of 
criminal sentencing.10  In 1981, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
confidently predicted that “collateral consequences” were on their way 
to extinction:  “As the number of disabilities diminishes and their im-
position becomes more rationally based and more restricted in cover-
age, the need for expungement and nullification statutes decreases.”11  
How wrong that prediction was. 
The modern era of escalating prison populations that began in 
the mid-1980s saw a retreat from the forgiving spirit of the earlier pe-
riod.  Retribution replaced rehabilitation as the goal of corrections.  
Collateral penalties were promulgated indiscriminately by legislatures 
and administrative agencies, mandating exclusion of people with a 
 
7
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile:  The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 153 (1999). 
8
Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society:  Forgiveness, Redemption, and the 
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 764-70 (2011).  
9
See Frank J. Remington, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Criminal Code:  Why 
the Model Penal Code Approach is Preferable, 7 FED. SENT’G. REP. 116, 116 (1994) (report-
ing on a colloquy between Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael at a 1951 meeting of 
the American Law Institute convened to consider preparing a model penal code). 
10
THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REPORT:  CORRECTIONS 88 (1967); see also id. at 90-91; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS’ MODEL SENTENCING AND COR-
RECTIONS ACT §§ 4–1005 (1978) (defining unlawful discrimination in relation to collat-
eral consequences of conviction); NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS & GOALS, CORRECTIONS 592-93 (1973) (suggesting that states repeal legisla-
tion depriving convicted individuals of civil rights or other attributes of citizenship).   
11
See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LEGAL STATUS OF 
PRISONERS § 23-8.2 cmt. at 143 (2d ed. 1983).   
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criminal record from a wide range of benefits and opportunities.12  At 
the present time, a minor drug conviction can make a person ineligi-
ble for welfare benefits, public housing, a driver’s license, student 
loans, insurance, voting, government employment, and hundreds of 
different types of jobs requiring a license—including, of course, ad-
mission to the bar.  It can also lead to mandatory deportation for a 
noncitizen and to loss of pension benefits for a public employee.13  
Repeat offenses—even minor ones that do not result in prison time—
can result in designation as a “career criminal” and harsh recidivist 
sentences.14  An eighteen-year-old caught having sex with his fifteen-
year-old girlfriend may be required by law to register for life as a sex 
offender, to leave school, and to move out of his parents’ home if it 
happens to be located within half a mile of a place where children 
 
12
Collateral consequences have been inventoried in a variety of states and at the 
federal level.  See, e.g., KATE ADAMSON ET AL., LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE & SEC. PROGRAM, 
UNIV. OF ARIZONA, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION IN ARIZONA 
(2005), available at www.reentry.net/public2/library/attachment.139610; CMTY. RE-
ENTRY PROGRAM, PUB. DEFENDER SERV. FOR D.C., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:  A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL DE-
FENSE LAWYERS (2004), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pdf/ConsequencesTo 
CriminalConvictionsDC.pdf; DEFENDER ASS’N OF PHILA. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
PROJECT, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES FOR PENNSYLVANIA ADULT DEFENDANTS BY 
CRIMINAL STATUTE (2011), available at http://attorneycapone.com/Collateral%20 
Consequences/PA%20Adult%20Collateral%20Consquences%20Index_10.13.11.pdf; 
REENTRY OF EX-OFFENDERS CLINIC, UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF LAW, A REPORT ON COLLAT-
ERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN MARYLAND (2007), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/cc_report2007.pdf; KELLY POFF 
SALZMANN & MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTIONS, INTERNAL EXILE:  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN 
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS (2009), available at  http://www.abanet.org/cecs/ 
internalexile.pdf; MCGREGOR SMYTH, THE BRONX DEFENDERS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK STATE (2010), available at http://www. 
reentry.net/ny/search/item.76898; Kimberly R. Mossoney & Cara A. Roecker, Ohio 
Collateral Consequences Project:  Executive Summary, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 611 (2005); Manu-
als & Overviews, MICH. REENTRY L. WIKI, http://reentry.mplp.org/reentry/ 
index.php/Manuals_%26_Overviews:_Collateral_Consequences_in_Michigan (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2011).  The Court Security Act of 2007 included a provision requiring the 
National Institute of Justice to undertake a fifty-state survey of all collateral conse-
quences.  See Pub. L. 110-177, § 510, 121 Stat. 2534, 2543-44.  The ABA later won a con-
tract to do the actual compilation work, and that project is currently under way. 
13
See infra text accompanying notes 29-31.  
14
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) (imposing a fifteen-year sentence for unlaw-
ful possession of a firearm by an individual with three prior convictions for violent fel-
onies or serious drug offenses); see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL § 4B1.1 (2011) (setting guidelines for “Career Offender[s]”).  See generally WAYNE 
A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER:  CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFI-
CATION LAWS IN AMERICA 49-84 (2009) (explaining regime of registration and notifica-
tion requirements applicable to sex offenses).  
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congregate, such as a school or even a bus stop.15  These are not pen-
alties over which a court has any control. 
Beyond the legal barriers facing a convicted person, there is social 
stigma that even misdemeanants can experience on a continuing ba-
sis.  For example, a recent study of online job advertisements posted 
on Craigslist in five major cities noted widespread use of blanket poli-
cies excluding anyone with any type of conviction from consideration 
for entry-level jobs, such as warehouse workers, delivery drivers, and 
sales clerks.16  People of means are not exempt from this chill, as gov-
ernment procurement officials and private insurance companies steer 
clear of businesses that employ people with a criminal record.17  Polit-
ical candidates do not even want their campaign contributions.18  Law 
firms and human resource consultants counsel their clients (“just to 
be safe”) against hiring anyone whose background includes any ad-
verse encounter with the law.19 
As collateral penalties have proliferated in legal codes and admin-
istrative rules, the mechanisms for overcoming them have atrophied.  
Governors no longer regard pardoning as part of their job, and judi-
cial expungement and sealing are no longer reliable remedies in light 
of modern technology.  The status imposed by conviction has become 
increasingly public, and background checks increasingly routine, even 
for volunteer jobs in the community.  After the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, an entire industry devoted to “backgrounding” sprang 
up almost overnight, operating essentially without regulation.20  (It is 
now surprisingly easy to delve anonymously into someone’s past:  a 
Google name search may bring up an unsolicited offer from a private 
screening company to do a criminal background check on a neighbor, 
 
15
See generally LOGAN, supra note 14, at 49-84.  
16
See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”:  THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACK-
GROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1, 13-18 (2011), available at http://www. 
nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf?nocdn=1. 
17
See, e.g., SALZMANN & LOVE, supra note 12, at 33-37 (listing federal statutes and 
regulations debarring people with a conviction from various federal programs and 
contracting opportunities); see also 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 500/50-10.5 (West 
2010) (prohibiting the government from contracting with companies that employ 
people convicted within the past five years of particular crimes).  Most states have 
substantially similar laws.   
18
Information originated from author’s personal communications with clients.  
19
Information also originated from author’s personal communications with clients. 
20
See RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 16, at 1. 
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coworker, or teacher for as little as fifteen dollars.21)  Some state 
courts—including those in Pennsylvania—now make their records 
freely available online.22 
And of course more and more people are caught up in the drag-
net of the criminal justice system.  A recent study by the National Em-
ployment Law Project (NELP) estimated that there are now as many 
as sixty-five million Americans with a criminal record,23 and Justice 
Department statistics suggest that NELP’s number is conservative.24  
Most do not go to prison, but all face a modern civil death, in law and 
in fact.  That people of color are disproportionately branded and os-
tracized is particular cause for alarm.25  If we still like to imagine our 
country as the “land of second chance,” and rejoice at Michael Vick’s 
redemption, as a practical matter our laws and attitudes all point in 
the opposite direction. 
 
21
According to a survey published in 2010 by the Society of Human Resources 
Management, ninety-two percent of their polled members perform criminal back-
ground checks on some or all job candidates, while seventy-three percent perform 
checks on all job candidates.  See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECK-
ING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundCheckCr
iminalChecks.aspx.  The recent filing of numerous national class actions against both 
criminal background screeners and employers under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
underscores the breadth of noncompliance with the law.  See, e.g., Williams v. Staffing 
Solutions Se., Inc., No. 10-0956 (N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 11, 2010) (alleging a failure to pro-
vide pre-adverse action notice or an opportunity to dispute accuracy); Henderson v. 
HireRight Solutions, Inc., No. 10-0443 (N.D. Okla. filed Feb. 1, 2010) (alleging the re-
porting of expunged convictions); Ryals v. HireRight Solutions, No. 09-0625 (E.D. Va. 
filed Oct. 5, 2009) (alleging a failure to comply with notice requirements); Hunter v. 
First Transit, Inc., No. 09-6178 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 5, 2009) (alleging a failure to pro-
vide pre-adverse action notice or an opportunity to dispute accuracy); Joshaway v. First 
Student Inc., No. 09-2244 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2009) (alleging a failure to provide pre-
adverse action notice or an opportunity to dispute accuracy).  
22
See, e.g., Common Pleas Court Docket Sheets, PENNSYLVANIA’S UNIFIED JUS. SYS., 
http://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
23
RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 16, at 3. 
24
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, more than ninety-two million indi-
viduals were in the files of the state criminal history repositories on December 31, 2008 
(though an individual may have records in more than one State). BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS, 2008, at 2, 12 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
bjs/grants/228661.pdf.   
25
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Pun-
ishment:  Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895 (1999). 
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II.  IS FORGIVENESS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED? 
There are the beginnings of resistance to a regime of exclusionary 
laws and policies, as policymakers understand that degraded status 
and lost opportunities exact a high price in public safety and taxpayer 
burden, quite apart from considerations of fair play for the individuals 
affected.  When people returning from prison are barred from jobs 
and housing, they are more likely to slip back into a life of crime.26  It 
is the goal of so-called reentry programs to see that this does not hap-
pen.  When people continue to experience discrimination decades af-
ter their rehabilitation is secure, others observing them may reasona-
bly ask what the point is in trying. 
The Supreme Court has been an unexpected change agent, giving 
lawyers and judges new reason to concern themselves with how collat-
eral sanctions are imposed and how they might be avoided.  In its 
groundbreaking Padilla decision, the Court held that a criminal de-
fense lawyer was constitutionally required to advise his noncitizen cli-
ent considering a guilty plea that he was almost certain to be deported 
as a result.  Characterized by the concurring Justices as a “major up-
heaval in Sixth Amendment law,”27 Padilla’s rationale is hard to con-
fine to deportation consequences alone, but potentially extends to 
other status-generated penalties that are sufficiently important to a 
criminal defendant to influence his willingness to plead guilty.  Lower 
courts have already extended Padilla’s pre-plea notice requirements to 
registration and supervision applicable to sex offenders.28  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court is presently considering whether a retired 
 
26
See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Convic-
tion:  A Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 605 (1997) (“The more 
that convicted persons are restricted by law from pursuing legitimate occupations, the 
fewer opportunities they will have for remaining law abiding.”); Eric H. Holder, Jr., At-
torney Gen. of the U.S., Address at the European Offenders Employment Forum (Oct. 8, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-
101008.html (“If having a job is central to successful reentry, then it is no wonder that 
half of all released prisoners will be reincarcerated within three years.”).   
27
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
28
See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after Padilla v. Kentucky:  From 
Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript 
at 18-20), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883809 (citing State v. Fonville, No. 
294554, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 140, at *36-37 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2011); In re 
C.P.H., No. A-0936-08T4, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1721, at *16 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2010); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)). 
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public school teacher should be allowed to withdraw his plea to a mis-
demeanor that cost him his pension.29 
Padilla has had a seismic effect on criminal practice.  Competent 
defenders are now expected to advise their clients about collateral pen-
alties and incorporate them into negotiations with prosecutors over the 
disposition of criminal charges.  Judicious prosecutors are taking steps 
to protect against post-conviction challenges based on consequences of 
which no one was aware, and are more open to alternative dispositions 
that do not result in a conviction record.  Courts can no longer declare 
collateral consequences to be “civil” and therefore “none of our business” 
just because they do not control their imposition. 
The Padilla decision suggests that forgiveness has a constitutional 
dimension.  In finding a constitutional obligation to warn, the Court 
emphasized that deportation is a “virtually inevitable” consequence of 
a guilty plea since Congress has eliminated judicial and administrative 
mechanisms for discretionary relief.30  It is likely that if Mr. Padilla’s 
banishment had not been such a foregone conclusion, the Court 
would not have considered it so important that he be given a chance 
to avoid it.  Even before Padilla, the supreme courts of Maine and 
Massachusetts refused to give retroactive effect to “punitive” lifetime 
sex offender registration requirements, finding the unavailability of 
waiver constitutionally relevant under the ex post facto and due pro-
cess clauses.31  Where a consequence is found to be punitive and there 
 
29
Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1091 (Pa. Super. July 23, 2010) 
(holding that defense counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to inform client 
that plea would forfeit pension), appeal granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010). 
30
130 S. Ct at 1478.  
31
See State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009) (“The retroactive application of 
the lifetime registration requirement and quarterly in-person verification procedures 
of SORNA of 1999 to offenders originally sentenced subject to SORA of 1991 and 
SORNA of 1995, without, at a minimum, affording those offenders any opportunity to 
ever be relieved of the duty as was permitted under those laws . . . is punitive . . . .”); 
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d 298, 309 (Mass. 2008) (“[T]he retroac-
tive imposition of the registration requirement without an opportunity to overcome 
the conclusive presumption of dangerousness that flows solely from Doe’s conviction, 
violates his right to due process under the Massachusetts Constitution.”).  The Padilla 
Court pointed out, respecting pre-1996 immigration law, that “‘preserving the possibil-
ity of’ discretionary relief from deportation . . . ‘would have been one of the principal 
benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to 
proceed to trial.’”  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 
(2001)).  The Court also noted that the Sixth Amendment had been held applicable to 
requests for relief from deportation under the JRAD—judicial recommendation 
against deportation—authority that existed prior to 1990, on the theory that seeking 
relief from deportation was “part of the sentencing” process.  See id. at 1480 (citing 
Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)).    
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is no possibility of forgiveness, even the “cruel and unusual punish-
ment” clause of the Eighth Amendment may be implicated.32 
Competent lawyers therefore need to know not only what collat-
eral sanctions will apply to their clients upon conviction, but also how 
to avoid or mitigate them, including at sentencing itself.  Prosecutors 
and judges need this information too, in order to understand their 
own obligations to core principles of proportionality and fairness—
principles that must now be understood to apply not just to the court-
imposed sentence, but also to collateral penalties affecting significant 
private interests that otherwise will last a lifetime.  Fairness is a particu-
larly relevant concern where such penalties bear little or no relation-
ship to the underlying criminal conduct, or where the passage of time 
has attenuated any relationship that might once have existed. 
Categorical status-generated sanctions that admit of no exceptions 
and last a lifetime look and feel a lot like punishment.  This is particu-
larly the case when any relationship between the past crime and the 
present punishment has become attenuated.  Empirical research by 
the dean of American criminologists, Alfred Blumstein, has estab-
lished that there is a point in time at which an individual who has re-
mained crime-free is no more likely to reoffend than someone in “a 
reasonable comparison group,” so that “we can be confident that re-
demption has occurred” and that the person ought to be “released 
from bearing the mark of crime.”33  It is something of an embarrass-
ment that the law, supposedly the manifestation of society’s most en-
lightened values, should lag behind cold science in recognizing the 
virtues of forgiveness. 
III.  REINVENTING FORGIVENESS IN UNFORGIVING TIMES 
If forgiveness for those convicted of crime is desirable as public 
policy and perhaps in some cases even constitutionally required, it 
remains to consider how it can best be packaged for a modern audi-
ence.  One approach is grounded in rules, and takes the form of dura-
tional limits on collateral penalties that may be triggered by the satis-
faction of conditions.  The best example of this is the automatic 
 
32
While no court has invalidated a collateral consequence under the Eighth 
Amendment, this relief is at least theoretically available where a consequence is found 
to be constitutional punishment.  Cf. Abraham, 996 A. 2d at 1094 (holding that “the 
pension forfeiture is akin to a fine and is punitive in nature” under ex post facto and 
due process case law). 
33
Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 328, 332 (2009).   
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restoration of basic civil rights that occurs in most states upon dis-
charge from sentence.  Debarment from government contracts or 
program participation is typical for a time certain, as are restrictions 
on driver’s licenses.  Federal law restricts licensure as a mortgage orig-
inator for seven years after conviction of most crimes—though fraud 
results in permanent disqualification that can only be relieved by a 
pardon.  Durational limits embody a categorical legislative approach 
to sanctioning, just like mandatory minimum sentences.  Such me-
chanical class-wide dispensations are conceptually quite different from 
true mercy, which in its essence depends upon individual desert. 
Pardon exemplifies the other approach to official forgiveness, 
one that depends upon the exercise of discretion in favor of an indi-
vidual as opposed to a class.  The power to forgive through the 
granting of a pardon was included in the federal Constitution, and 
in the constitutions of every state, not as a perk of office but as an 
indispensable and beneficent power of government.  In the Federal-
istPapers, Hamilton spoke of the “necessary severity” of the criminal 
code that requires “an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortu-
nate guilt,” lest justice “wear a countenance too sanguinary and cru-
el.”34  He argued that “[h]umanity and good policy conspire to dic-
tate that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as 
possible fettered or embarrassed.”35  James Iredell, speaking in sup-
port of the pardon power in the North Carolina Ratifying Conven-
tion, noted that “an inflexible adherence” to a general law “might 
frequently be the cause of very great injustice.”36 
As the Framers hoped and expected, pardon functioned as a fully 
operational component of state and federal justice systems from the 
earliest days of the Republic, moderating mandatory prison sentences, 
restoring rights, and attesting to an individual’s rehabilitation.37  Even 
after the introduction of parole in the early nineteenth century, par-
don was venerated as a “patriarch” in a comprehensive 1939 Justice 
Department study of prison release mechanisms.38  Until the mid-
1980s, the routine availability of pardon after sentence meant that a 
 
34




James Iredell, Address in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 
1788), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, PART TWO 875 (Bernard Bai-
lyn ed., 1993).   
37
Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1169, 1175-78 (2010).   
38
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCE-
DURES:  PARDON 295 (1939).   
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convicted person could look forward to a full and early reintegration 
into free society—with the same benefits and opportunities available 
to any other member of the general public—free of unwarranted col-
lateral penalties and the stigma of conviction. 
In the 1960s, as described earlier, judicial relief mechanisms like 
expungement and set-aside came into vogue as more reliable yet still 
respectable substitutes for pardon, to relieve less serious offenders of 
the need to report crimes in their past.  In addition, administrative 
and licensing agencies played a role in relieving certain types of dis-
qualifications in the context of character and fitness inquiries. 
Over the past thirty years, the old routes to official forgiveness 
have become impassable.  Pardon is neglected by politicians, disre-
spected by criminal justice professionals, and dismissed as cronyism by 
a cynical public.  Benjamin Button–like, Hamilton’s “benign preroga-
tive” has regressed from patriarch to unruly stepchild, and denied 
privileges at the same table with the grown-up powers of government.  
Justice Anthony Kennedy urged “reinvigorat[ion]” of the pardon 
power in a 2003 speech to the ABA, opining that a “people confident 
in its laws and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy.”39  It does 
not appear that any occupant of the White House or Justice Depart-
ment, then or now, paid him any mind. 
At the same time, relief premised on concealment has become in-
creasingly unreliable and unpopular with advances in technology and 
a public appetite for full disclosure.  Busy criminal courts resist efforts 
to give them more business, especially business that is not directly re-
lated to disposition of the charges.  For example, courts in New York 
have since the 1970s had the power to relieve legal disabilities at sen-
tencing, but their lack of interest was the occasion for an embarrass-
ing legislative scolding in August 2011.40  Administrative boards have 
become almost as reluctant as governors and presidents to exercise 
their power to forgive, lest they make a career-ending mistake.  Sys-
temic efforts to compensate for a failure of forgiveness, like “ban-the-
 
39
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Ad-
dress at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), in 16 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 126, 128 (2003).   
40
See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 702(1) (McKinney 2011).  The memorandum accom-
panying this change in the law states that certificates are a “powerful tool . . . to pro-
mote and encourage successful reintegration after a conviction,” but notes that they 
are “underutilized” and that “only a tiny fraction” of those eligible actually hold them.  
Summary and Justifications of Bill A07597A, 2011 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), 
available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/2011-amend-Corr-L-702.pdf.   
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box” legislation or limits on pre-employment inquiries, simply kick the 
moment of truth down the road. 
The general failure of official forgiveness in the criminal justice 
system calls for innovative thinking.  If the pardon power cannot be 
reinvigorated, as Justice Kennedy urged, perhaps it can be reinvented. 
It happened that just two days after Justice Kennedy delivered his 
now-iconic speech to the ABA, that organization adopted a set of 
standards that proposed a new template for limiting and rationalizing 
the collateral consequences of conviction.41  Borrowing the framework 
proposed some forty years earlier in the Model Penal Code, the ABA 
Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification 
proposed that forgiveness should be an important responsibility of the 
court that imposes punishment.42  Limited relief from sanctions that 
frustrate reentry should be available as early as sentencing, with a 
fuller pardon-like forgiveness available after a more sustained period 
of good conduct.  Six years later, the Uniform Law Commission 
adopted the two-tiered relief scheme of the ABA Standards, with addi-
tional protections against negligence liability for anyone willing to 
take a risk on a person deemed rehabilitated.43  The idea of the relief 
provisions of the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act 
(UCCCA) is to remove mandatory legal barriers and allow a deci-
sionmaker to consider an individual fairly on the merits.  Like the 
ABA Standards, the UCCCA also requires that all conviction-related 
disabilities and disqualifications be collected in one place, and that 
courts warn defendants about them before accepting a guilty plea and 
at sentencing.44 
The ABA Standards and the UCCCA recognize that two things will 
lessen the need for a back-end pardoning mechanism:  (1) greater 
transparency in the process by which collateral penalties are adopted 
and imposed in the first instance; and (2) more rational and enforce-
able standards for considering past criminal conduct in allocating 
benefits and opportunities.  The fuller integration of collateral sanc-
tions into plea negotiations and sentencing hastened by the Padilla 
 
41
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at § 19-2.5.    
42
Id. cmt. at 33-34 & n.40 (discussing the judicial restoration provisions of the 
1962 Model Penal Code); see also Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate:  
In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1727-
33 (2003) (discussing section 306.6 of the Model Penal Code as a model for section 19-
2.5 of the ABA standards). 
43
See UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 14 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2010final_amends.pdf.   
44
Id. § 6. 
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decision will in time lead away from the punitive model of collateral 
penalties that has developed over the past three decades.  A federally 
funded effort now under way to compile collateral penalties indicates 
that there are hundreds of such penalties in every state’s statutes and 
administrative codes, a revelation that may result in some soul-
searching and retrenching.  If courts must ensure that defendants are 
informed about applicable collateral sanctions before they accept a 
guilty plea, excessive severity may disrupt the system of resolving crim-
inal cases on which the government has come to depend.  When pros-
ecutors find it harder to craft acceptable plea offers because of collat-
eral penalties, when defendants are willing to risk going to trial to 
avoid them, and when judges are moved to set pleas aside because the 
agreed-upon deal later seems unfair, the system of collateral conse-
quences that traps so many in a degraded social status is likely to de-
velop ways of making exceptions.  As Stephanos Bibas has argued re-
specting the impact of the Padilla decision on the procedural aspects 
of the plea process,45 substantively too the move toward a consumer 
protection model now seems inevitable.  The result will be a fairer, 
safer, and more efficient justice system. 
The dismantling of a regime of mandatory collateral penalties will 
not be fully effective to address the problem of discrimination based 
upon conviction as long as there are no clear and enforceable stand-
ards to guide discretionary decisionmaking.  Employers otherwise will-
ing to recognize redemption frequently hesitate to take a chance on 
someone with a criminal record, even knowing that a past conviction 
is a poor predictor of future criminality, deterred as much by negative 
public attitudes as by any genuine risk of harm.  The legal system owes 
them some greater degree of support.  Conviction should be grounds 
for adverse action only if the underlying conduct is directly and sub-
stantially related to the benefit or opportunity at issue.  The law ought 
also provide some insulation against negligence claims, as through re-
liance on an official certification of good conduct.  Finally, govern-
ment officials with access to a bully pulpit can lead a campaign to in-
fluence public attitudes toward people with criminal convictions who 
have made genuine efforts to reform. 
 
45
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:  From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1153 (2011) (arguing that Padilla may 
prompt the extension of consumer protection principles to plea bargains).  
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CONCLUSION 
The collateral penalties that result from a criminal conviction have 
multiplied in the past thirty years with little evident attention to their 
broader effect on the community.  There is not a jurisdiction in the 
country where all of these penalties have been inventoried, and only a 
few that have an effective way of curtailing or mitigating their effect.  
Many years after conviction, these penalties frequently serve only as irra-
tional punishment, not reasonable regulation.  Even when the law does 
not pose an absolute bar to some benefit or opportunity, decisionmak-
ers tend to be reluctant to take a chance on someone with a record. 
For the one in four adult Americans who have some sort of crimi-
nal record, Padilla v. Kentucky came at an opportune time.  Though its 
holding focused narrowly on a defense lawyer’s obligation to warn the 
client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, Padilla’s 
broader systemic effects on the justice system cannot be underesti-
mated.  In particular, Padilla has forced attention to the way in which 
collateral penalties have created a large new class that is unprotected 
by the law and permanently relegated to the margins of society.  Un-
less we as a society are comfortable living with a growing class of “in-
ternal exiles” who have no way to pay their debt to society and return 
to its good graces—with the attendant public safety risks and moral 
dilemmas—we should be looking for a more effective way of giving 
convicted individuals a fair chance to become fully productive mem-
bers of society.  That is why, so many years later, Hamilton’s observa-
tion about the conspiracy of humanity and good policy still rings true. 
Jack Chin has argued, in an article that will be published as part of 
this Symposium, that the only way to save ”modern civil death” from 
constitutional infirmity is to insist upon a case-by-case imposition of 
collateral penalties.  But the problem is not simply that these penalties 
are unavoidable; it is also that, if imposed, they cannot be mitigated.  
Legislatures are likely too fond of nondiscretionary punishments to do 
away with categorical penalties entirely, but case-by-case forgiveness 
could be made available, whether directed to a specific penalty or in 
the form of a more general pardon.  If chief executives were more 
willing to use their constitutional pardon power to make what Hamil-
ton described as “exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt,”46 and if 
legislatures were more willing to trust courts or administrative agen-
cies to “dispense[] the mercy of the government,”47 it would not be 
 
46
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 34, at 447. 
47
Id. at 448. 
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hard for us lawyers to construct a comprehensive and functional way of 
regulating access to the opportunities and benefits that may be neces-
sarily lost—at least temporarily—by virtue of committing a crime.  If we 
can construct and implement an airtight and inexorable system of pun-
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